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Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v. Lewis: An Analysis of the
Supreme Court's Definition of an
Implied Right of Action
NANCY E. UNDERWOOD*
Although a definitive test has not been formalized, the United States
Supreme Court has made further refinements to an area of increasing con-
cern-the implied cause of action. In seeking statutory relief, a litigant
has often been without redress as the Court has found inadequate ground
for the plaintiff to assert an injury. However, litigation is currently devel-
oping new causes of action which are available to individuals. The author
examines the case law which outlines a balancing tool incorporating the
various factors which give rise to an action. Notwithstanding a seemingly
well-defined approach, the courts have expressed a growing reluctance to
judicially create legal remedies. Consequently, a strict statutory construc-
tion approach has been adopted as the Court, in Transamerica, placed
greater emphasis on the language embodied in the statute to determine
whether it intended to authorize a cause of action.
On November 13, 1979, the United States Supreme Court de-
cided the case of Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis.'
The issue presented in Transamerica was whether the Invest-
* B.A., Emory University and Southern Methodist University; J.D., Emory
University; Winner, Giles Sutherland Rich National Moot Court Competition; As-
sociate, Hurt, Richardson, Garner, Todd & Cadenhead, Atlanta, Georgia. The au-
thor would like to acknowledge the assistance of Don Mazursky, a third year
student at the Georgetown University Law Center.
1. 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979).
ment Advisers Act gave rise "to an implied private right of action
for injunctive relief and damages on behalf of persons injured by
violations of its provisions."2 The issue of implied private causes
of action is one that has been of great concern to the Supreme
Court in recent years. The Court is in the process of formulating
and refining a definitive test through which to analyze this ques-
tion. Up to this point, however, the Court has dealt with cases in
which a cause of action is clearly implied or clearly not implied.
The Transamerica case falls into a gray area, which has required
the Court to further detail the guidelines of the test.
I. BACKGROUND
One of the earliest cases dealing with implied causes of action
in the securities area was J. I. Case Co. v. Borak.3 In Borak, a
stockholder of J. I. Case Company brought a civil action against
the corporation for violation of section 14(a) of the Security Ex-
change Act of 1934.4 This action was brought under the authority
of section 27 of the Act, which grants to the United States District
Courts exclusive jurisdiction over "all suits in equity and actions
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title
or the rules and regulations thereunder."5
Borak claimed that the defendants were responsible for a proxy
solicitation which was false and misleading and in violation of
section 14(a) of the Act and Rule 14A-9. It was asserted that
stockholders would not have approved the merger discussed in
the proxy solicitation but for the false and misleading statements,
and that the stockholders were thereby damaged by the merger.
Borak asked that the merger be declared void and that the stock-
holders be awarded damages.6
While the corporation argued that Congress did not specifically
2. Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237, 238 (1978).
3. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
4. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a),
provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person,. . . to solicit or to permit the use of
his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security
(other than an exempted security) registered on any national securities exchange
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the, public interest or
for the protection of investors ......
5. Section 27 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78, provides in part: "The district courts
of the United States, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and the
United States Courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title or the
rules and regulations thereunder, and all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the rules and regu-
lations thereunder. .. ."
6. 377 U.S. at 429-30.
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grant a private cause of action, the Court held that one was
clearly implied for both derivative and direct causes of action.
The Court, in Borak, pointed out that section 27 of the Act grants,
to the Court, jurisdiction over "all suits in equity and actions at
law brought to enforce any liabiltiy or duty created" under the
Act. Thus, Congress would not have granted jurisdiction over "ac-
tions at law" if no such actions existed.7
More importantly, in its analysis the Court examined the pur-
pose of section 14(a). The Court looked closely at both the lan-
guage and legislative history of the Act and found that its main
purpose was the protection of the public interest and the protec-
tion of investors.8 "While this language makes no specific refer-
ence to a private right of action, among its chief purposes is 'the
protection of investors,' which certainly implies the availability of
judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result."9
The Court also examined the remedial scheme devised by the
Act. While the Security Exchange Commission [hereinafter
SEC] is charged with enforcement of the provisions, the Court
concluded that the vast number of proxy statements submitted to
the SEC each year renders this mechanism, by itself, ineffective.
"Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary sup-
plement to Commission action."10
The Court considered the possibility that the implied cause of
action would interfere with state law but held that, although the
regulation of corporations is a function of state law, "the over-
riding federal law applicable here would, where the facts re-
quired, control the appropriateness of redress despite the
provisions of state corporation law .... 11
Thus, in recognizing an implied private cause of action, the
Supreme Court examined: (1) the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, (2) the legislative history of the Act, (3) the language of
the Act, (4) the remedial scheme of the Act, (5) the interference
with the operation of state law, and (6) the necessity of recogniz-
ing a private cause of action to carry out the purposes of the Act.
The Supreme Court did not again consider the issue of implied
7. Id. at 430.
8. Id. at 431-32.
9. Id. at 432.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 434.
rights of action until eleven years later when, in Cort v. Ash,12 it
established a four-part test which remains the basic analytical
tool for examining the issue of implied private causes of action.
In Cort, the plaintiff, a stockholder, alleged that the corporate di-
rectors had made illegal campaign contributions in violation of Ti-
tle 18 U.S.C. § 610, a federal criminal statute which prohibits
corporations from making certain political contributions. The
Court directly addressed the issue of whether this criminal stat-
ute would allow the plaintiff a private cause of action to sue for
injunctive relief and damages.13
The Court first considered the question of whether injunctive
relief could be granted under section 610, and held that it could
not.14 The Court then addressed the issue of whether section 610
granted a private cause of action to the plaintiff-stockholder to
sue derivatively for damages. The Court began this analysis by
setting out a four-factor test:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not ex-
pressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff
'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,' -
that is, does the statue create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Sec-
ond, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either
to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with under-
lying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the states, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?15
The Court applied this test to the facts in Cort, and held that
the plaintiff did not have an implied private cause of action. First,
the Court examined the policy underlying section 610 and found
"that the protection of ordinary stockholders was at best a secon-
dary concern."16 Second, the Court found no suggestion in the
12. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
13. Id. at 68.
14. The Court directed its attention to the fact that at the time the suit was
filed, there was no statutory provision for civil enforcement by private parties or
by the federal government. Id. at 73. However, in the interlude between filing and
arguments before the Court, new federal statutes had established a Federal Elec-
tion Commission and an administrative procedure for processing complaints of al-
leged violations of § 610 after January 1, 1975. Id. See also, 2 U.S.C. § 437(c) (a) (1)
(Supp. IV, 1970); 2 U.S.C. § 437g (Supp. IV, 1970), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 410 and
note following 2 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. IV, 1970). This new law gave the Commission
"primary jurisdiction" over violations of § 610. 422 U.S. at 75. The Court recog-
nized that this "intervening law" must be given effect. Id. at 76. Since the injunc-
tive relief which the Court was asked to grant would affect only future conduct of
the corporations, this conduct would come under the purview of the new statute
and administrative relief. Therefore, the Court refused to grant the private cause
of action for injuctive relief. Id. at 76.
15. Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 81.
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legislative history that Congress intended any sort of civil cause
of action. The Court wrote:
[IUt is not necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of
action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be
controlling. But where, as here, it is at least dubious whether Congress
intended to vest in the plaintiff class rights broader than those provided
by state regulation of corporations, the fact that there is no suggestion at
all that § 610 may give rise to a suit for damages or, indeed, to any civil
cause of action reinforces the conclusion that the expectation, if any, was
that the relationship between corporations and their stockholders would
continue to be entrusted entirely to state law.17
Third, the Court found a civil cause of action would not aid in the
enforcement of the statute, that is, it was determined that to per-
mit a derivative suit for damages was not only unnecessary, but
hindered the statutory scheme of enforcement.18 Finally, the
Court found a civil cause of action in this area should be governed
by state law. "We are necessarily reluctant to apply a federal
right to recover funds used in violation of a federal statute where
the laws governing the corporation may put a shareholder on no-
tice that there may be no such recovery."19
The Court distinguished the situation in Cort from that in
Borak. In Borak, the statute, under which a private cause of ac-
tion was implied, specified that an intrusion into the internal af-
fairs of corporations and a private cause of action was necessary
for the enforcement of the statute. In Cort, no such intrusion or
necessity existed. Thus, the Court held that no private cause of
action existed, "because injunctive relief is not presently avail-
able in light of the Amendments, and because implication of a
federal right of damages on behalf of a corporation under § 610
would intrude into an area traditionally committed to state law
without aiding the main purpose of § 610 ....
Since Cort, the Supreme Court has decided several cases which
speak directly to the issue of implied rights of action. In 1979, the
Supreme Court found an implied private remedy did exist under
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972.21 Even
though the statute at issue was different because it did not in-
volve securities regulation, the Court's discussion and analysis
under the Cort test was applied to the Title IX case of Cannon v.
17. Id. at 83-84.
18. Id. at 84.
19. Id. at 84-85.
20. Id. at 85.
21. 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979).
University of Chicago.22 In Cannon, the plaintiff, a female,
claimed that the University had excluded her from participation
in its medical school programs because of her sex. The plaintiff
also alleged that the University had accepted federal funding for
its medical school program, so that its discriminatory actions vio-
lated Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972. In its
opinion, the Court accepted the plaintiff's allegations as true.
Section 901(a) of Title IX states:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, or be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance .... 23
Thus, the Court faced the issue of whether this section of Title IX
vested a private cause of action in the plaintiff.
The Court pointed out that the plaintiff had exhausted her ad-
ministrative remedies as required by the University. She had ap-
plied to the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare
[hereinafter HEW] for administrative relief, but the action taken
by the HEW did not serve to remedy her situation. 24 The district
court and court of appeals both held that section 901 did not cre-
ate a private cause of action. The decisions of these courts relied
heavily upon their view that section 902 of Title IX created an
"exclusive means of enforcement" under the Act.25 However, in
reversing the decisions of these courts, the Supreme Court
stressed that, "[alt least since September 17, 1974, HEW has
taken the position that an implied cause of action does exist
under Title IX in certain circumstances. . . .Since 1974, HEW has
apparently never taken the position that exhaustion [of adminis-
trative remedies] is required in every case."26 The court of ap-
peals was cognizant of this position but disagreed with the HEW's
interpretation of the Act.27
The Supreme Court went on to note that the determining factor
of whether an implied private cause of action exists is whether
Congress intended such an action to be implied. The Court stated
that "before concluding that Congress intended to make a remedy
22. Id. at 1949.
23. 20 U.S.C. § 901(a)(1972).
24. 99 S. Ct. at 1949-50. "HEW informed petitioner that the local stages of its
investigation had been completed but that its national headquarters planned to
conduct a further 'in depth study of the issues raised' because those issues were 'a
first impression and national in scope.'. . . as far as the record indicates HEW has
announced no further action in this case."
25. Id. at 1951. The Act gave HEW the power to terminate the funds allocated
to a recipient which violated the anti-discrimination provisions of the Act. The Act
also established administrative procedures to effect this termination. See, Educa-
tion Amendments Act of 1972, § 902, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1973).
26. 99 S. Ct. at 1952 n.8.
27. Id. at 1952-53.
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available to a special class of litigants, a court must carefully ana-
lyze the four factors that Cort identifies as indicative of such an
intent. '28 The Court then followed the test in Cort, reasoning
under the first factor, "the threshold question," the Court held
that the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of
which the plaintiff was a member.2 9
There would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of indi-
vidual persons if Congress, instead of drafting Title IX with an unmistaka-
ble focus on the benefitted class, had written it simply as a ban on
discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition
against the disbursement of public funds to educational institutions en-
gaged in discriminatory practices.
30
The Court reviewed the second factor of Cort through an exam-
ination of legislative history and found that "the history of Title
IX rather plainly indicates that Congress intended to create such
a remedy."3 1 The Court concluded that Title IX was patterned af-
ter Title VI with the word "sex" substituted for the words "race,
color, or national origin. '32 Thus the Court held that, "[w] e have
no doubt that Congress intended to create Title IX remedies com-
parable to those available under Title VI and that it understood
that Title VI is authorizing an implied private cause of action for
victims of prohibited discrimination." 33
The Court then considered the third factor in Cort, which is
whether a private cause of action is consistent with the underly-
ing purposes of the legislative scheme. The Court found that the
administrative remedy provided for in the Act was too blunt an
instrument to provide effective protection for the rights of individ-
uals, which were the main focus of the Act. Thus, a private cause
of action was not only consistent with the statutory scheme, but
was a necessary mechanism in the plan.3 4
28. Id. at 1953. The Court quoted the entire text in Cort.
29. Id. at 1954.
30. Id. at 1954-55.
31. Id. at 1956.
32. Id. at 1957. The two statutes, Title IX and Title VI, use identical language
to describe the benefited class. Both statutes provide the same administrative
mechanism for terminating federal financial support for institutions engaged in
prohibited discrimination. Neither statute expressly mentions a private remedy
for the person excluded from participation in a federally funded program. The
drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it would be interpreted and applied as
Title VI had been during the preceding eight years. In 1972, when Title IX was
enacted, the critical language of Title VI had already been construed as creating a
private remedy.
33. Id. at 1961.
34. Id. at 1961-62.
Under the fourth factor of Cort, the Supreme Court easily found
that the private cause of action stemming from this discrimina-
tory conduct was within the purview of federal law, and did not
impinge upon the jurisdiction of state law. 35
Thus, the Court decided that an implied private cause of action
did exist under Title IX. The Court stated that this was an atypi-
cally easy case since all of the factors in the Cort test supported
the same result and no balancing of the various factors was nec-
essary.36
The University of Chicago argued that no implied private cause
of action should be recognized under Title IX and that a private
cause of action would unduly burden the school's admission deci-
sions by subjecting it to judicial scrutiny. The Court responded
by stating that Congress, as a matter of policy, had already deter-
mined that the admissions process should be subjected to scru-
tiny. The University supported its argument solely on speculation
and did not provide any data to show that the implication of a pri-
vate cause of action would levy an additional burden on the Uni-
versity's admissions process. 3 7 Additionally, the University
argued that Cort should not imply a private cause of action, inas-
much as Congress chose not to specify one when it had the oppor-
tunity. Citing Borak, the Court stated: "The fact that the other
provisions of a complex statutory scheme create express reme-
dies has not been accepted as sufficient reason for refusing to im-
ply an otherwise appropriate remedy under a separate section."38
The Court went on to note:
When Congress intends private litigants to have a cause of action to sup-
port their statutory rights, the far better course is for it to specify as much
when it creates those rights. But the Court has long recognized that
under certain limited circumstances the failure of Congress to do so is not
inconsistent with an intent on its part to have such a remedy available to
the persons benefited by its legislation.3 9
Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Stewart joined, wrote a
concurring opinion which reflected some increasing pressure
within the Court to narrow these guidelines. 40 Justice Rehnquist
stated that the issue of whether an implied private cause of action
exists should be decided through statutory construction. He
urged the Court to refrain from creating causes of action and in-
stead to enforce the law as written by the Congress as the appro-
priate branch of government. Justice Rehnquist wrote:
35. Id. at 1963.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1964.
38. Id. at 1965.
39. Id. at 1967-68.
40. Id. at 1968.
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We do not write on an entirely clean slate, however, and the Court's
opinion demonstrates that Congress at least during the period of the en-
actment of the several titles of the Civil Rights Act tended to rely, to a
large extent, on the courts to decide whether there should be a private
right of action, rather than determining this question for itself. Cases
such as J.I. Case v. Borak . . .and numerous cases from other federal
courts, gave Congress good reason to think that the federal judiciary
should undertake this task.
I fully agree with the Court's statement that "[w]hen Congress intends
private litigants to have a cause of action to support their statutory rights,
the far better course is for it to specify as much when it creates those
rights." It seems to me that the factors to which I have here briefly
averted apprise the lawmaking branch of the Federal Government that the
ball, so to speak, may well now be in its court. Not only is it, "far better"
for Congress to so specify when it intends private litigants to have a pri-
vate cause of action, but for this very reason this Court in the future
should be extremely reluctant to apply a cause of action absent such spec-
ificity on the part of the Legislative Branch. 4 1
One month after the Cannon decision, the Supreme Court
handed down a decision in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,42
which reflects, to some extent, the adoption of the admonitions of
Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Cannon. Justice Rehn-
quist wrote for the majority and indicated that while the Court is
wrestling with the issue of implied private causes of action, the '
question is really one of statutory construction. 43
In Redington, the plaintiff sought to impose liability upon
Touche Ross under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 for improperly auditing and certifying financial statements
of Weis Securities, Inc. and for improperly preparing answers to
the SEC financial questionnaire. 44 The statute at issue, section
17(a) states:
Every national securities exchange, every member thereof.., and every
broker or dealer registered pursuant to. . .this title, shall make, keep and
preserve for such periods, such accounts, correspondence ...and other
records, and make such reports, as the Commission by its rules and regu-
lations may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
4 5
The Court addressed the issue of whether this statute implies a
private cause of action. Justice Rehnquist began the discussion of
this question by emphasizing that the fact that a statute was vio-
lated or that a person incurred damages does not necessitate the
implication of a private cause of action. "Instead, our task is lim-
41. Id. (citations omitted).
42. 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979).
43. Id. at 2482 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
44. Id.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 789(a)(1970).
ited solely to determiruing whether Congress intended to create a
private right of action asserted by SIPC and the Trustee."46
In analyzing the intent of Congress, the opinion follows and re-
fines the test established in Cort. The decision first considered
the language of the statute to ascertain whether the plaintiff was
an intended beneficiary of the statute. The Court found that Con-
gress did not intend for a certain class of persons to benefit from
the statute, but that the statute merely set up a reporting mecha-
nism which would provide information to government authorities
which would allow them to perform effectively.4 7 Some critics
have urged that the Court could have stretched this intent to
show that the effective performance of the government agencies
would protect the class to which this plaintiff belonged. However,
the Court was not willing to go this far. The Court reasoned:
In terms, § 17(a) simply requires broker-dealers and others to keep such
records and file such reports as the Commission may prescribe. It does
not, by its terms, purport to create a private cause of action in favor of
anyone. It is true that in the past our cases have held that in certain cir-
cumstances a private right of action may be implied in a statute not ex-
pressly providing one. But in those cases finding such implied private
remedies, the statute in question at least prohibited certain conduct or cre-
ated federal rights in favor of private remedies. By contrast, § 17(a)
neither confers rights on private parties nor prescribes any conduct as un-
lawful.4 8
This statement emphasizes an extremely important distinction
between Cannon, Borak, and other earlier.cases. Unlike those
cases, Redington placed new emphasis on the importance of stat-
utory construction.
Proceeding along the guidelines of Cort, the Court in Redington
examined the legislative history behind section 17(a) and found
that it was silent as to the issue of a private remedy. Since the
clear intent of the language of the statute was to deny a private
remedy, the Court interpreted the silence as a further indication
of Congressional intent to deny an implied cause of action.
And where, as here, the plain language of the provision weighs against im-
plication of a private remedy, the fact that there is no suggestion whatso-
ever in the legislative history that § 17(a) may give rise to suits for
damages reinforces our decision not to find such a right of action implicit
within this section.4 9
Thus, the finding that silence demonstrates an intention not to
create a private remedy turns on the fact that the language of the
statute shows a similar intent. This reasoning can be contrasted
to the situation in Cannon, in which federal law granted a class of
persons certain rights, and the silence in the legislative history as
46. 99 S. Ct. at 2485.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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to a private cause of action in no way hindered the implication of
such a remedy.5 0 This interpretaton of the silence in the legisla-
tive history is not a more conservative approach in determining
congressional intent, but indicates a different result in light of a
new factual situation.
The Court then examined section 18(a) which creates a
private cause of action against persons, such as accountants, who 'make or
cause to be made' materially misleading statements in any report or other
document filed with the Commission, although the cause of action is lim-
ited to persons who, in reliance on the statements, purchased or sold a se-
curity whose price was affected by the statements.5 1
The Court found that the class of persons to whom a cause of ac-
tion under section 18(a) was granted did not include the plaintiffs
in this case, and that the legislative history of section 18(a)
demonstrated an intent on the part of Congress that this should
be the exclusive private remedy under the act.
For where the principal express civil remedy for misstatements in reports
created by Congress contemporaneously with the passage of § 17(a) is by
its terms limited to purchasers and sellers of securities, we are extremely
reluctant to imply a cause of action in § 17(a) that is significantly broader
than the remedy that Congress chose to provide.
52
Next, using point three of the Cort test, the Court addressed the
issue of whether a private remedy under section 17(a) was "nec-
essary" for the effective enforcement of the section. The Court
held and strongly emphasized that "necessity" is irrelevant to the
discussion in this case:
It is true that in Cort v. Ash, supra, the Court set forth four factors that it
considered "relevant" in determining whether a private remedy is implicit
in a statute not expressly providing one. But the Court did not decide that
each of these factors is entitled to equal weight. The central inquiry re-
mains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by impli-
cation, a private cause of action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed
in Cort-the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and
its purpose are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative in-
tent.
53
This language seems to indicate that the "necessity" of a private
remedy for enforcement of a statute is no longer a determining
factor in deciding these cases. However, this holding is expressly
50. Id. at 2486. Compare to Cannon where the court wrote "[tlherefore, in sit-
uations such as the present one 'in which it is clear that federal law has granted a
class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create a
private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action
would be controlling.' Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 82" (emphasis in original). 99 S. Ct.
at 1956.
51. 99 S. Ct. at 1956.
52. Id. at 2487 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 2489 (citations omitted).
limited to the situation in this case where the statute proscribes
no conduct and creates no rights in any class of persons.
Here, the statute by its terms grants no private rights to any identifiable
class or prescribes no conduct as unlawful. And the parties as well as the
Court of Appeals agree that the legislative history of the 1934 Act simply
does not speak to the issue of private remedies under § 17(a). At least in
such a case as this, the inquiry ends there: The question whether Con-
gress, either expressly or by implication, intended to create a private right
of action, has been definitely answered in the cause of action under
§ 17(a). 5 4
The Court noted that section 27 of the Act grants exclusive ju-
risdiction to the federal courts for "all suits in equity and actions
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."5 5 It was held
that this provision is solely a jurisdictional section and creates no
cause of action. "The source of plaintiff's rights must be found, if
at all, in the substantive provision of the 1934 Act which they seek
to enforce, not in the jurisdictional provision."56 This statement is
a modification of the standard enunciated in Borak.57
In its closing statement, the Court in Redington explained that
this decision, as it differs from Borak, should be interpreted as "a
stricter standard for the implication of private causes of action."58
The Court was attempting to force Congress to create causes of
action where it intended them, and to limit the Court's power and
responsibility for judicial legislation. In light of this judicial pur-
pose, the decision in Redington can be viewed as defining a more
restrictive policy.5 9
The thrust of the decision in Redington was followed by the
Court in its recent decision of Transamerica. This latest decision
evidences the new policy of the Court to refrain from creating le-
gal remedies judicially and to force Congress to expressly define
its intention through legislation.
II. TRANSAMERICA MORTGAGE ADVISORS, INC. V. LEWIS
In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 60 the share-
54. Id.
55. 15 U.S.C. 78AA (1960).
56. Id.
57. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 430. The Borak court found that the jurisdic-
tional language implied the existence of a private remedy.
58. 99 S. Ct. at 2490.
59. Two circuit court cases which the Court relied upon in the Redington deci-
sion have recently denied applying a private cause of action. See, Falzarano v.
United States, 48 U.S.L.W. 2279 (lst Cir. 1979); Cedar-Riverside Assn., Inc. v. Min-
neapolis, 48 U.S.L.W. 2280 (8th Cir. 1979). In both of these cases, the courts applied
the Cort test and found that none of the four factors indicated that Congress im-
plied a private cause of action in the statute.
60. 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979).
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holder of a real estate investment trust filed shareholder and de-
rivative and class actions against the corporation for violation of
the Investment Advisers Act and of common law fiduciary duties.
The District Court found that section 206 of the Investment Advi-
sors Act of 1940,61 [hereinafter cited as the Advisors Act], affords
no private cause of action, and thus, the federal court had no ju-
risdiction over this claim.62 The plaintiff appealed to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals which faced the sole issue of whether
the Advisors Act gave "rise to an implied private right of action
for injunctive relief and damages on behalf of persons injured by
violations of its provisions." 63 The Court of Appeals reversed the
finding of the District Court and held that the Advisors Act did
create an implied private cause of action. The Supreme Court af-
firmed in part and reversed in part.
The Supreme Court first heard oral argument on this case in
March, 1979, without the participation of Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. The following month, the case was set for reargument. The
opinion indicates that the bench was split, with Justice Powell en-
tering the decisive concurring opinion. The decision reflects a
movement by the Court toward the position outlined in Powell's
dissent in Cannon.
The majority opinion relies primarily upon the reasoning out-
lined in Redington,64 while the dissent relies primarily upon
Cort.65 As outlined above, Cort analysis provides a four factor
test which is fairly precise. The test of Redington is less a test
than an attitude founded on strict statutory construction. The
Court began the opinion by stating that the "question whether a
statute creates a cause of action, either expressly or by implica-
tion, is basically a matter of statutory construction .... Accord-
ingly, we begin with the language of the statute itself."66 This
statement is illustrative of the Court's intent to move from Borak
while placing emphasis on the desirability of creating remedies
61. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1960).
62. Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1978).
63. Id. at 238.
64. 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979).
65. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
66. 48 U.S.L.W. 4001, 4002 (1979) (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S.
Ct. 2479 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979); National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S.
453 (1974).
and to instead focus on the intent of Congress. The Court ex-
plained:
While some opinions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis
upon the desirability of implying private rights of action in order to pro-
vide remedies thought to effectuate the purposes of a given statute ...,
what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to cre-
ate the private remedy asserted, as our recent decisions have made clear.
We accept this as the appropriate inquiry to be made in resolving the is-
sues presented by the case before us.67
The attitude of Justice Rehnquist as expressed in Redington, is
dominant throughout the Court's opinion 68 and is clearly evi-
denced in the above statement.
In Transamerica, the Court looked first to the language of the
Advisors Act, focusing primarily on sections 215 and 206. Section
215 provides that, "contracts whose formation or performance
would violate the Act 'shall be void . . . as regards the rights of'
the violator and knowing successors-in-interest." 69 Section 206
described conduct of investment advisors which is prohibited by
the Act.
The Court held that section 215 implies a private cause of action
for contract rescission, injunctive relief or restitution but that sec-
tion 206 does not imply a cause of action for damages. The Court
found that the statutory language of section 215 implies a right to
specific and limited relief in a federal court. This section declares
certain contracts void and thus anticipates the civil litigation
which is necessary to declare a particular contract void. The
Court held:
For these reasons we conclude that when Congress declared in Section
215 that certain contracts are void, it intended that the customary legal in-
cidents of voidness would follow, including the availability of a suit for re-
scission or for an injunction against continued operation of the contract,
and for restitution. Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals was
correct in ruling that the respondent may maintain an action on behalf of
the Trust seeking to void the investment advisers contract. 70
Thus, the Court ruled that the shareholders could file an action to
have the advisory contract between the Trust and Transamerica
declared void. As part of the contract action, shareholders could
seek restitution sufficient to reimburse them for any losses in-
curred.
67. Id. at 4002 (citations omitted).
68. Such attitude is seen in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago:
[N] ot only is it, 'far better' for Congress to so specify when it extends pri-
vate litigants to have a private cause of action, but for this very reason this
Court in the future should be extremely reluctant to apply a cause of ac-
tion absent such specificity on the part of the Legislative Branch.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1968 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
69. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4003.
70. Id.
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The Court then reviewed section 206 of the statute, stating,
we view quite differently, however, the respondent's claim for damages
and other monetary relief under Section 206. Unlike Section 215, Section
206 simply proscribes certain conduct, and does not in terms create or al-
ter any civil liabilities. If monetary liability to a private plaintiff is to be
found, it must read it into the Act.71
The Court defended this position by citing certain facts. First, the
Court pointed out the remedies expressly provided by the statute.
Criminal penalties are available for prosecution of willful viola-
tions of the Act under section 217 and the SEC is authorized by
section 209 to bring civil actions in federal court to compel compli-
ance with the Act. In addition, administrative sanctions may be
imposed by the SEC in accordance with section 203, for violations
of the Act, including violations of section 206. Thus, the Court
concluded, "in view of these express provisions for enforcing the
duties imposed by section 206, it is highly improbable that 'Con-
gress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private rem-
edy.' "72
Second, the Court explained that the existing circumstantial ev-
idence weighs against the implication of a private right. "Under
each of the securities laws that preceded the Act here in question,
and under the Investment Company Act, which was enacted as
companion legislation, Congress expressly authorized private
suits for damages in prescribed circumstances. '73
Finally, the Court noted that the original jurisdictional section,
section 214, originally referred to "actions at law" and to "liabil-
ity," but that both terms had been omitted from the bill after sen-
ators met with representatives of the investment advisers
industry and the staff of the SEC. "The unexplained deletion of a
single phrase from a jurisdictional provision is, of course, not de-
terminative of whether a private remedy exists. But it is one
more piece of evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize
a cause of action for anything beyond limited equitable relief. '74
The Court specifically rejected the respondent's contention that
the Court should consider, in addition to the intent of Congress,
the utility of a private remedy. The Court stated:
We rejected the same contentions last Term in Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, supra where it was argued that these factors standing alone
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1971 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting)).
74. Id. at 4004.
justified the implication of a private right of action under Section 17(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. We said in that case: 'It is true that
in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that it considered 'relevant'
in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not ex-
pressly providing one. But the Court did not decide that each of these fac-
tors is entitled to equal wieght. The central inquiry remains whether
Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private
cause of action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cort-the lan-
guage and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose, are
ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent.7 5
The Court is establishing a trend of strict statutory construction
which appears to be superseding the four factors of the Cort test.
In the above quote, the Court seeks to explain away the Cort test
by saying that the four factors actually consist of an inquiry into
congressional intent, which inquiry can best be maintained by
strict statutory construction.
Clearly, the Transamerica case goes one step beyond Reding-
ton because, in the former, the evidence of Congressional intent
does not mitigate as clearly in favor of denying the remedy sought
by the respondent. The Court admits that the issue sub judicia is
clouded by the fact that section 206 was intended to protect the
victims of the fraudulent practices it prohibited. The Court sig-
nalled its move beyond Redington by stating that the statute was
designed to protect advisor's clients does not require the implica-
tion of a private cause of action for damages on their behalf. The
Court wrote:
The statute in Touche Ross by its terms neither granted private rights to
the members of any identifiable class, nor prescribed any conduct as un-
lawful. In those circumstances it was evident to the Court that no private
remedy was available. Section 206 of the Act here involved concededly
was intended to protect the victims of the fraudulent practices it prohib-
ited. But the mere fact that the statute was designed to protect advisers'
clients does not require the implication of a private cause of action for
damages on their behalf.
7 6
Thus, the Court has exhibited an unwillingness to judicially cre-
ate private rights of action. This attitude was urged by Justices
Rehnquist and Stewart in their concurring opinion in Cannon.
The approach was followed by the majority in Redington and em-
phasized by the Court in Transamerica. Moreover, the language
of Transamerica is quite definite in this regard. When discussing
the fact that Congress expressly authorized suits for damages in
each of the securities laws which preceded the Advisors Act, the
Court remarked, "[o]bviously, then, when Congress wished to
provide a private damage remedy, it knew how to do so and did so
expressly."77
75. Id. (citations omitted).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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III. OTHER RECENT DECISIONS
The adoption, by the Court, of strict statutory construction and
its preference for refraining from engaging in judicially created
legislation, could lead one to conclude that the Court will decreas-
ingly imply rights of action. However, this conclusion is tempered
by other recent decisions in which the Court "discovers" new im-
plied rights of action where Congress had failed to expressly cre-
ate the remedy. Such decisions include Gladstone Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood;78 Davis v. Passman;79 Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp. 8 0
In Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, the Supreme
Court expanded the remedies available to individuals and munici-
palities pursuant to the Fair Housing Act of 1968. The Court held
that the plaintiffs had standing to assert a violation of the Act for
the alleged steering of prospective home buyers, even though the
plaintiffs were not personally discriminated against or actual vic-
tims of the steering. The decision holds that the
complaint alleging that violations by real estate brokerage firms and em-
ployees were depriving plaintiff residents of the village of 'social and pro-
fessional benefits of living in an integrated society' was sufficient
allegation of injury to the plaintiff individual residents of the described
area, to confer standing, subject to requirements of proof. 81
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 did not expressly create a private
right of action, but such a remedy was inferred by the Court.
Davis v. Passman provides a broad new constitutional basis for
sex and racial discrimination suits against members of Congress
and other federal governmental employees. The decision holds
that the fifth amendment provides a constitutional basis for indi-
viduals to sue federal officials for alleged deprivation of life, lib-
erty or property without due process. The plaintiff brought this
action in federal court against her former employer, a congress-
man, alleging that her employment as a deputy administrative as-
sistant was terminated solely because of her sex.
In Reiter v. Sonotone, the Court unanimously ruled that Con-
gress, in the 1914 Clayton Antitrust Act, intended to allow direct
consumer purchasers (as well as larger entities) injured by price
fixing, to bring treble damage suits against the manufacturers en-
gaging in such anti-competitive activities.
78. 99 S. Ct. 1601 (1979).
79. 99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979).
80. 99 S. Ct. 2326 (1979).
81. 99 S. Ct. at 1602.
In deciding these three cases, the Court confused the issues by
failing to restrict itself to an approach of strict statutory construc-
tion. An obvious distinction between Gladstone, Davis, Reiter
and Transamerica lies in the fact that only Transamerica deals
with a securities action and therefore may be interpreted solely
within that realm. Transamerica does rely heavily upon the au-
thority of Redington which was also an action based on securities
statutes. However, such an explanation seems inadequate due to
the fact that the Court in Transamerica developed its analysis
through broad discussions of Cort82 and Cannon v. University of
Chicago,83 neither of which involve construction of a securities
statute. To resolve this contradiction requires some discussion of
Davis, Gladstone, and Reiter.
In Davis, the Court specifically addressed the question of why,
in that case, it was unnecessary to follow the reasoning of Reding-
ton.
It is in this sense that the Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner
lacked a cause of action. The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion
through the application of the criteria set out in Cort v. Ash . . . , for as-
certaining whether a private cause of action may be implied from 'a stat-
ute not expressly providing one.' The Court of Appeals uses criteria to
determine that those in petitioner's position should not be able to enforce
the Fifth Amendment's due process clause, and that petitioner therefore
had no cause of action under the amendment. This was error for the ques-
tion of who may enforce a statutory right is fundamentally different than
the question of who may enforce a right that is protected by the constitu-tion 81 4
While this distinction between rights of action implied by statutes
and rights of action implied by the constitution appears legally
sound, it is in fact merely the Court's avenue for reaching a de-
sired result. The most incisive explanation for the contradictory
aspects of Davis and Transamerica lies in the fact that, of the five
justices who wrote the majority opinion in Davis, all but one dis-
sented in Transamerica. Of the four dissenters in Davis, all were
part of the majority in Transamerica. Justice Blackman was the
only judge who stayed with the majority in both Transamerica
and Davis. Thus, the attitude of the Court cannot be treated as a
single entity, but rather must be described with reference to
these two groups. Justices Stewart, Burger, Powell, and Rehn-
quist urge strict statutory construction, while Justices Brennen,
Marshall, Stevens and White are less inclined to be bound by
rigid tests of congressional intent.
Gladstone may, at first glance, appear to be a "discovery" by
the Court of a new cause of action. However, the language of the
82. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
83. 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979).
84. 99 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1979) (citations omitted).
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opinion is limited to the question of whether the respondents had
standing to bring suit against the petitioners. The respondents,
the Village of Bellwood (two blacks and four whites) acted as
"testers" in an attempt to determine whether the petitioners (two
real estate brokerage firms and nine of their employees) were en-
gaging in racial steering. The Court in Gladstone does seek to de-
termine whether the respondents have asserted a cause of action,
but the determination depends upon whether the respondents
have standing and not whether a right of action is implied by stat-
ute. Thus, Gladstone can be distinguished from Transamerica on
these grounds.
In Reiter, the Court held that a consumer whose money had
been diminished by reason of an antitrust violation on the part of
the manufacturer was injured in his property within the meaning
of the Clayton Act. The effect of this decision is to create a new
cause of action by allowing a consumer to assert a violation of the
Clayton Act. The opinion, written by Mr. Chief Justice Burger, is
carefully restricted to a discussion of whether or not the clause
"business or property" in section 4 of the Act was intended to
limit standing to sue under the Act to those engaged in commer-
cial ventures. The Court's analysis in Reiter does reflect some
consistency with the language of Transamerica. The Court wrote,
"as is true in every case involving the construction of the statute,
our starting point must be the language employed by Congress." 85
The Court then outlined what it considered to be the "usual
meaning of the phrase 'business or property.'" Thus, the Court
stated that it would adhere to congressional intent, and it then
proceeded to reach its own conclusion. It is important to note,
however, that the Court felt it necessary to state that the inquiry
rested upon the language employed by Congress. Justice Rehn-
quist seems to hint at the contradiction in his concurring opinion
when he states, "I fully agree that we must take the statute as
Congress wrote it, and I also fully agree with the Court's con-
struction of the phrase 'business and property.'"86
While the result in Reiter is to create a new cause of action, the
Court does seem to imply a willingness to maintain the approach
of strict statutory construction. Thus, it is the manner in which
85. Id. at 2330 (1979).
86. Id. at 2334.
the Court reaches its decision which is most critical to an analysis
of judicial attitudes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The recent decision of Transamerica does signal further adop-
tion by the Court of an approach of strict statutory construction
and an unwillingness by the Court to "discover" new causes of ac-
tion which are not expressly created by Congress.
However, four of the nine justices presently on the bench seem
less infatuated with the concept of strict statutory construction
and seem inclined to adopt a more flexible test which allows some
consideration of the equities of a particular case.
The Court has also indicated it will rely on the Transamerica
principles of determining whether a right of action is implied only
when it is seeking to determine whether Congress intended for a
statute to provide such a remedy. The same rules do not apply to
the determination of whether a particular group of litigants is en-
titled to assert an injury which is addressed by a particular stat-
ute. Additionally, the Court has, after confining itself to the
language of the statute, allowed some leeway in determining what
the statutory language means.
